Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

[ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>]

Good morning list,

To elucidate further ---

Suppose rather than `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`, we created a new opcode, `OP_CHECKSIG_WITHOUT_INPUT`.

This new opcode ignores any `SIGHASH` flags, if present, on a signature, but instead hashes the current transaction without the input references, then checks that hash to the signature.

This is equivalent to `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`.

Yet as an opcode, it would be possible to embed in a Taproot script.

For example, a Decker-Russell-Osuntokun would have an internal Taproot point be a 2-of-2, then have a script `OP_1 OP_CHECKSIG_WITHOUT_INPUT`.
Unilateral closes would expose the hidden script, but cooperative closes would use the 2-of-2 directly.

Of note, is that any special SCRIPT would already be supportable by Taproot.
This includes SCRIPTs that may potentially lose funds for the user.
Yet such SCRIPTs are already targetable by a Taproot address.

If we are so concerned about `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` abuse, why are we not so concerned about Taproot abuse?

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj