From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from silver.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3C4EC0051 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2020 13:32:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B9E320377 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2020 13:32:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from silver.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BsfNjf2GpnNO for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2020 13:32:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-40135.protonmail.ch (mail-40135.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.135]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BFF020378 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2020 13:32:12 +0000 (UTC) Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2020 13:31:58 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail; t=1601731929; bh=PuU0dX6XOYwPvXrXnA1Z/qKdpgvBqy4BPyx/Hq7ts3U=; h=Date:To:From:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=sBIH7wNpaV3w3zG+KNN9SqIgd/t0lnEXc+wpkufbBJzsNQf+0MKN1rfkdxbeNG3iE ODuB1v9VorWkZNXvJtdxqP8Klj7mMskV7rEPKUcw/xdHv8LYrQ84EWgfvLYm4ltbZx Ip+W5arqHbXH2yeCeMspoiX9YfXEjepnExSWpjh4= To: Chris Belcher , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: <813e51a1-4252-08c0-d42d-5cef32f684bc@riseup.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap appendium X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2020 13:32:14 -0000 Good morning Chris, > > Looking at these equations, I realize that the incentives against > post-coinswap-theft-attempt still work even if we set K =3D 0, because th= e > extra miner fee paid by Bob could be enough disincentive. This made me pause for a moment, but on reflection, is correct. The important difference here relative to v1 is that the mining fee for the= collateralized contract transaction is deducted from the `Jb` input provid= ed by Bob. > Unlike the v1 protocol, each CoinSwap party knows a different version= of > the contract transactions, so the taker Alice always knows which make= r > broadcast a certain set of contract transactions, and so can always b= an > the correct fidelity bond. Great observation, and an excellent property to have. Will go think about this more. Regards, ZmnSCPxj