From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1WDcr6-0001Xq-T6 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 12 Feb 2014 16:40:12 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of m.gmane.org designates 80.91.229.3 as permitted sender) client-ip=80.91.229.3; envelope-from=gcbd-bitcoin-development@m.gmane.org; helo=plane.gmane.org; Received: from plane.gmane.org ([80.91.229.3]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1WDcr5-0002tq-Rg for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 12 Feb 2014 16:40:12 +0000 Received: from list by plane.gmane.org with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1WDcqx-0007wA-My for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 12 Feb 2014 17:40:03 +0100 Received: from 69-172-146-209.cable.teksavvy.com ([69.172.146.209]) by main.gmane.org with esmtp (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Wed, 12 Feb 2014 17:40:03 +0100 Received: from carterd by 69-172-146-209.cable.teksavvy.com with local (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Wed, 12 Feb 2014 17:40:03 +0100 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net From: Dan Carter Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 08:34:48 -0800 Message-ID: References: <20140209180458.GB20126@savin> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Complaints-To: usenet@ger.gmane.org X-Gmane-NNTP-Posting-Host: 69-172-146-209.cable.teksavvy.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:29.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/29.0a1 In-Reply-To: <20140209180458.GB20126@savin> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [80.91.229.3 listed in list.dnswl.org] -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (carterd[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record 0.0 DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED No valid author signature, adsp_override is CUSTOM_MED -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.7 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 1.2 NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED ADSP custom_med hit, and not from a mailing list X-Headers-End: 1WDcr5-0002tq-Rg Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Decentralized digital asset exchange with honest pricing and market depth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 16:40:13 -0000 I'm not sure how well this would work. Sure it would provide honest historical pricing, but those who wait for publication confirmation may be at a disadvantage -- to get the best deal possible Bob would connect to as many nodes as he could, examine the stream of unconfirmed asks coming in and sign the best ones before someone else does. The network would gravitate towards an O(n^2) fully connected network, because being fully connected means one is fully aware of all unconfirmed asks at any moment so one can make the best judgement and buy before someone else does. The seller needs a guarantee that all bidders can act on the ask transaction simultaneously. Maybe the partial ask transaction could be time-locked with a network propagation delay, there would be multiple bidder responses and the winner is chosen by lottery (and fee priority) by the bitcoin/alt-coin miner who confirms the atomic transaction in their block. That would eliminate the advantage to being fully connected as it would no longer matter that one can act first, so you have a more sane network. On 2014-02-09 10:04 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > Proof-of-publication(2) offers a solution. Alice can embed her > incomplete transaction as data in a second, valid, transaction. She > broadcasts this secondary transaction to some agreed upon blockchain, > either the one the colored coin is in, or potentially a secondary system > with suitable proof-of-publication security. Bidders such as Bob can now > scan the blockchain for offers with an acceptable price. (the offers can > make use of techniques like prefix filters to allow Bob to only scan > part of the blockchain, although Bob needs to know the status of all > assets of the type he is interested in anyway)