Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable
Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:04 AM
UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:04 AM
From: contact@taoeffect.com
To: Kekcoin <kekcoin@protonmail.com>
Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this? Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose?
OK, maybe "post-UASF coinbase coins" is a better term? I just wanted to make it clear that this refers to coins that come from blocks generated after the UASF is activated.
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You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this? Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose?