From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 486F12C for ; Sun, 21 Jul 2019 23:12:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:15:21 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from blaine.gmane.org (195-159-176-226.customer.powertech.no [195.159.176.226]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 14C2EE6 for ; Sun, 21 Jul 2019 23:12:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from list by blaine.gmane.org with local (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1hpKkw-0015O6-PE for bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org; Mon, 22 Jul 2019 00:56:38 +0200 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org From: Andreas Schildbach Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 00:56:33 +0200 Message-ID: References: <59fad2b6-9b15-ffec-116e-91d27ce29f80@mattcorallo.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=andreas@schildbach.de; keydata= xsDiBD/S9DARBACgg0IF3cCFaNXbQtCAZBpiZRawQAfsfL87sHhy1xq3UwR4RmQKsWjtZQ9C 7kSDTkzzn7Sqg+YtXgiJdGeYinSMy+6mBKQjtrIKLikbjB1ORTfA29m7m7VTBY9X3Cvmpm0+ 0mWvrQ9hSpq8adXitY4Z+/VB/1YSo77RakfNr3sQOwCgzrXH37AlAu307IgOOFnI1y78Y4cD /29gtaY3/u8ThFI/mXBOHnfXaIVGLYKtlf2Lyj2JnixhhzxEpuDJ0lkcyNQ0N7Ky8ohJS3tG ShwHjsQNtqK2V1DomsUnDI/W4hJNCSd0zfIoQgHvE1RbOyOpz4F+CNw8uQcxwE5FmwRtk6xa zJsiMVKLFhKr6LnMoVaNi8mZZFKzA/9HcXAse5epfrZD1tt7dHr58+egIA0OkoQ8oUgqCgN1 4qmUxQoWTdmvet0E+XaHcowr1fXu79uQ2zuvHSk/S4mjP6uT+XOxENVcKRUtyEBtSzFDyyCj 853KrBQSppCgxS8loHj1g1YIKqu97kGVtfmHM9L9TPVA1opuYOcJh7iJ9s0qQW5kcmVhcyBT Y2hpbGRiYWNoIDxhbmRyZWFzQHNjaGlsZGJhY2guZGU+wl4EExECAB4FAj/S9DACGwMGCwkI BwMCAxUCAwMWAgECHgECF4AACgkQymYr4YuHemD4NACePnpSANmR2vrZVv+BteOva6gzOJ0A nioa6JoKCYx3jQOIqoBGcBUkc8q1zsFNBD/S9DgQCACctel4AnL7nuh+Uv+IBz0GMvu6Ewdn sVCOLf54neIxuaW4BC5RYAdS6Tkp3hxv+ZfA0Uv6X3nz4tOsVHD50+CCq51pRlnbUwcWcn9e nynJyddTjei+JmJrdOJOAzWa/al8YagjQSZqgD6mmPUy/a201Bh0L2zbLmxQMFg+PPB81j4y UmSXmhYzg/+SonZ3lr9pJNtoZszg95NDyYBceiF5RSw4Qusi+C5/W3nIKzuaIKZijE9Dvo6D W6ggbB/gSxDTSjvrnvvXeG1SdlKLeFvsJ9y/0ro3EP01RRVJvA5RaM5W2MRbwGuSRcSw8B74 6ijEOqSh0IYLXoHdV7Vj4Qt/AAMFB/9ZcgxVGvs2ob6MCTVdPLlVKRKDn7RjZiDE6hRa/jp7 ewdstjjc22DU/jCz16IX75B/sr1cDJqbChONFdljjQNWe2cTFXSazUjsyZa35+KvehDi7cAU +vCYmisMpkPM41hR6HYqjadDp6gOVJTnHPcJ6EPdgUQTsNQH3dCTD68b5WwzBEBNLdwyDGLK McExzaOClwwSeHBmnj72O7Chdhn/M/2+fpTUPqhp/0sflVyR/ILyc/KEp85pwani2dXuZ02i gSaSIBwQJOVrjsUTwp2Wxdmywt13/cGGVlsGLe8lY0Kv6G43/eip+42OfIVhxRgARRtJ5KjK chTLwfl3tbgawkkEGBECAAkFAj/S9DgCGwwACgkQymYr4YuHemAWjACgtRlmiISVlCf7/mum klJfLM6wKIMAnA2uS1BS4d7GJkQp09ViaWmUUsMc In-Reply-To: <59fad2b6-9b15-ffec-116e-91d27ce29f80@mattcorallo.com> Content-Language: en-US X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_ADSP_ALL, RDNS_DYNAMIC autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 03:42:10 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin Core to disable Bloom-based Filtering by default X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2019 23:12:12 -0000 An estimated 10+ million wallets depend on that NODE_BLOOM to be updated. So far, I haven't heard of an alternative, except reading all transactions and full blocks. It goes without saying pulling the rug under that many wallets is a disastrous idea for the adoption of Bitcoin. > well-known DoS vectors I asked many people, even some "core developers" at meetings, but nobody ever was able to explain the DoS vector. I think this is just a myth. Yes, you can set an overly blurry filter and thus cause useless traffic, but it never exceeds just drinking from the full firehose (which this change doesn't prohibit). So where is the point? An attacker will just switch filtering off, or in fact has never used it. > It is not anticipated that > this will result in a significant lack of availability of > NODE_BLOOM-enabled nodes in the coming years Why don't you anticipate that? People almost never change defaults, especially if it's not for their own immediate benefit. At the same time, release notes in general recommend updating to the latest version. I *do* anticipate this will reduce the number of nodes usable by a large enough amount so that the feature will become unstable. > clients > which rely on the availability of NODE_BLOOM-supporting nodes on the > P2P network should consider the process of migrating > to a more modern (and less trustful and privacy-violating) alternative > over the coming years. There is no such alternative. I strongly recommend postponing this change until an alternative exists and then give developers enough time to implement, test and roll out. I also think as long as we don't have an alternative, we should improve the current filtering for segwit. E.g. testing the scripts themselves and each scriptPubKey spent by any input against the filter would do, and it also fixes the main privacy issue with server-side filtering (wallets have to add two items per address to the filter).