From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D60ABC000D for ; Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:41:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B674F40842 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:41:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 1.101 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.101 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL=0.5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lvp2teIUqeUe for ; Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:41:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail4.protonmail.ch (mail4.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.27]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBCB440840 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 2021 14:41:31 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2021 14:41:24 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail; t=1633444888; bh=7rmCjtaJSw+gC3ymZ8HWDX1ISH/SVqZc6ZJpqOGqD0c=; h=Date:To:From:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=sADyCLDTfqk+WEic8a9Al91EjFLln/RqmOYj4cRwz04ALKC9lPK6HPxrJH0O046eR NkoEDwwIRNf+wSTYrVUYwsWdF8HOVTBeY1Yq2WXaS40tZQV8R911nVYOOUsfQlLX4S Tl/I6IWHz3ptOPk7pWBSeoK23naEeZpAa64iWDPI= To: Nathan T Alexander , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Question- must every mining rig attempt every block? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2021 14:41:33 -0000 Good morning Nathan, > For purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some > non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would > be accepted by that rig? > > Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the > network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their > bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute? They are "identified" by the address that is on the coinbase output. There is nothing preventing a *single* miner having *multiple* addresses, i= n much the same way that a *single* HODLer is not prevented from having *mu= ltiple* addresses. > > Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be > accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful > block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light= . Since a miner can have multiple addresses, the miners can game this by simp= ly grinding on *which* of their multiple addresses gets the green light. That grinding is no more different in quality than grinding the block hash. Thus, you just move proof-of-work elsewhere and make it harder to see, not = reduce it. Worse, *identifying* miners reduces the important anonymity property of min= ing. With non-anonymous mining, it is much easier for states to co-opt large min= es, since they are identifiable, and states can target larger miners. Thus, miners ***must*** use multiple addresses as a simple protection again= st state co-option. > > Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the > miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set by > algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block. The power consumption of proof-of-work ***is not a problem***, it is instea= d the solution against state co-option. If you reduce the power consumption, it becomes easier for states to simply= purchase and co-opt mines and attack the system, since it is easier to mus= ter the power consumption and outright 51% Bitcoin. The power consumption is an important security parameter, ***even more impo= rtant than raw hashes-per-second***, since hashes-per-second will inevitabl= y rise anyway even with constant power consumption. It should always remain economically infeasible to 51% Bitcoin, otherwise B= itcoin will ***die*** and all your HODLings in it. Regards, ZmnSCPxj